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Introduction 
 
”The Magna Charta of international refugee law…did not 
deliberately omit persecution on gender…it was not even 
considered.”1 
 
In 1989, Cynthia Enloe asked the subversive question: “Where are the 
women?” in her groundbreaking work on gender and international relations.2 
Her work forms part of an attempt at a reconstruction by feminist scholars who 
seek to make visible both “women” and different kinds of masculinity and 
femininity necessary “to make the world go round”.3 The question has 
become known as “the woman question” and has continued to be asked in 
many other areas where women have been invisible fo 4r too long.  
                                                
 
This paper applies the same feminist methodology, i.e. it consciously seeks to 
place women and their experiences into the framework of human rights law 
and refugee law. Refugee law is especially interesting from a gendered 
perspective, as women constitute a majority of the refugees in the world.5 
However, as most refugees are fleeing hunger and poverty, they are 
disqualified from the definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention6, which limits 
the notion to specific cases of persecution. Some would argue that the 
historical focus on civil and political rights in international law is a 
consequence of the gender bias that flows through the historical development 
of human rights.7  
 
There are circumstances which give rise to women’s fear of persecution, that 
are unique to women. However, the existing bank of jurisprudence on the 
meaning of persecution is based on, for the most part, the experiences of 
male claimants. Aside from a few cases of rape, the definition has not widely 
been applied to such female-specific experiences, as genital mutilation, bride-
 
1 Judith Kumin, commenting on the fact that gender is not enumerated among the grounds of 
persecution in the 1951 Refugee Convention, cited on UNHCR’s webpage 
<http://www.unhcr.org> (2000-11-23). 
2 Cynthia Enloe, ”Bananas, Beaches and Bases”, University of California Press, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, California, 1989,  at 7. 
3 Jan Jindy Pettman, “Worlding Women, a Feminist International Politics, Routledge, 
Australia, 1996, at ix. 
4 That it is still a highly relevant question can be illustrated with the following sample. In 2001, 
a female Swedish journalist wrote a book describing her experiences during the wars in the 
Balkans. Commenting the book, a high ranking (male) Swedish military writes “ … It feels a 
bit strange for an officer, that it is a woman that describes this world, the most male of worlds, 
the every- day-life of war, so thoroughly and with such insight” (author’s translation). 
Apparently, this man has over-looked the fact that women are very much involved in the 
every-day-life, in particular as part of the civilian population. 
5 UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 39 (XXXVI) on Refugee Women and 
International Protection. UN Doc. HRC/IP/2/Rev. 1986 (July 8, 1985). 
6 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951:189 UNTS 137. 
7 E.g. Charlotte Bunch, ”Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist perspective”, Women’s 
Rights, Human Rights, Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, 1995 Routledge, Great Britain, at 14. 
 3
burning, forced marriages, domestic violence, forced abortion, or compulsory 
sterilisation.8 
 
As Maja Kirilova Eriksson has pointed out, the division of international law in  
human rights, humanitarian law and refugee law can be classified as a result 
of traditional fragmentary thinking. As a consequence, certain “grey” zones 
have appeared in the international legal framework to the disadvantage of 
women.9 A feminist methodology must, therefore, strive for a more holistic 
approach, which this paper tries to by using ideas and concepts from a 
number of different disciplines, ranging from international relations and 
international law to philosophy and psychology.  
 
The paper is divided into three parts, 
 
 The first part describes the feminist methodology and to some degree 
also different forms of feminism. It describes certain terms and areas 
that have been and continue to be vital to the feminist legal discourse. 
This approach aims to give a fuller picture and understanding to the 
mechanisms behind the issues that are being treated in the other two 
parts. 
 
 The second part looks closer at international refugee law, making use 
of the feminist methodology as described in the first part. In particular, 
it examines the fact that gender is absent from the enumerated 
grounds of persecution in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 
consequences of this omission. 
 
 Finally, the third part studies refugee law and practice at the domestic 
level, where the example of Sweden serves as a case study. In 1997, a 
new article was introduced in the Swedish Aliens Act, which aimed to 
inter alia encompass cases of gender-based persecution as a basis for 
granting asylum. The third part applies the methodology and the 
theories elaborated in the preceding parts, to the Swedish legislation 
and its practical application. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Audrey Macklin, “Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories”, Human Rights 
Quarterly 17 (1995) 213-277, at 225. 
9 Maja Kirilova Eriksson, ”Att gå på två ben eller ett, betraktelsesätt på mänskliga rättigheter”, 
Feminstiskt perspektiv 1/00, 5 –12, at 9. 
 4
 
PART 1  METHODOLOGY AND NOTIONS 
 
1.1. Feminist jurisprudence 
 
The appearance of autonomy in law is maintained by a methodological 
framework called “legal reasoning”, which purports to derive objective rules 
and principles. However, as this “objectivity” is based on a presumption in 
which the male role has been taken as a norm for society as a whole, there is 
a gender bias embedded in the policies and structures that stem out from 
traditional legal thinking. For this reason, feminist critiques of law have 
centred on how legal discourse through its expertise and organisation has 
served to silence voices of experience of women.10 Feminist jurisprudence 
has focused on the ways law legitimises, maintains, and serves the 
distribution of power in society. Catherine MacKinnon has defined it as ”…an 
examination of the relationship between law and society from the point of view 
of all women.”11 Some feminists have adopted the metaphor “gender lenses” 
to describe an approach to feminist analysis which brings into view the 
different dimensions of power and gender inequality.12 In that regard it has 
links to “critical legal studies”.13 
 
Feminist jurisprudence thus consists of two discrete projects; 
 
 The first is to unmask and critique the patriarchy behind purportedly 
ungendered law. 
 
 The second step consists of what can be called “reconstructive 
jurisprudence”.  
 
For strategic reasons, many feministic law reforms during the last twenty 
years, have often been achieved by categorising women’s injuries as 
analogous to, if not identical with, injuries men suffer. This can, however, be 
seen as a misconceptualisation as it maintains the original presumptions and 
does not challenge the basis for these presumptions.  Instead, reconstructive 
feminist jurisprudence should set itself the task of reconceptualising new 
rights in such a way as to reveal, rather than conceal their origin in women’s 
distinctive existential and material state of being.14 With regards to refugee 
law, this may translate into the discussion concerning the scope of the five 
grounds for persecution in the 1951 Refugee Convention. The fundamental 
question here is whether women’s experiences can be interpreted so that they 
                                                 
10 Celina Romany “State Responsibility goes Private” in Human Rights of Women, National 
and International Perspectives, ed. Rebecca J.Cook, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, 
85-115, at 88. 
11 Quoted in Heather Ruth Wishik, “To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist 
Jurisprudence” in Feminist Legal Theory, Foundations, Ed. D. Kelly Weisberg, Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia, 1993, 22-31, at 22. 
12 Jill Steans, “Gender and International Relations”, Polity Press, 1998, at 4. 
13 Wishik, supra note 11, at 22. 
14 Robin West, ”Jurisprudence and Gender”, in Feminist Legal Theory, Foundations, Ed. D. 
Kelly Weisberg, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1993, 75-98, at 88. 
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may be included into the already existing grounds or whether it is necessary 
to add a sixth ground (gender), in order to encompass all forms of gender-
based persecution. 
 
Heather Ruth Wishik has expressed the purpose of feminist jurisprudence as: 
 
“We risk promoting women’s oppression if we attempt only to 
change the law and its impacts on women’s lives and neglect to 
ask the questions suggested by feminist jurisprudence. Without 
such inquiries, reforms which may appear positive due to their 
short-term availability to ameliorate women’s oppression may 
strengthen patriarchy in the long run. Feminist jurisprudence can 
help enable women to see such dual effects and to make 
conscious decisions about whether or which way to proceed.”15 
 
This insight has gained ground also beyond the feminist circles as the Council 
of Europe has stated that: 
 
“There is a growing awareness that gender has to be considered 
also at a political and institutional level.…Gender is not only a 
socially constructed definition of women and men, it is a socially 
constructed definition of the relationship between the sexes. This 
construction contains an unequal power relationship with male 
domination and female subordination in most spheres of life. Men 
and their tasks, roles, functions and values contributed to them are 
valued—in many aspects—higher than women and what is 
associated with them. It is increasingly recognised that society is 
characterised by this male bias. Policies and structures often 
unintentionally reproduce gender inequality.”16 
 
In order to avoid continuing existing bias it is necessary to question the reality 
behind the presumptions. For the purpose of a feminist inquiry into the 
relationship between law and society, the following questions may be asked: 
 
 What have been and what are now all women’s experiences of the “life 
situation” addressed by the doctrine, process, or area of law under 
examination?17  
 
 What assumptions, descriptions, assertions and/or definitions of 
experience – male, female, or ostensibly gender neutral – does the law 
make in this area? 
 
 What is the area of mismatch, distortion, or denial created by the 
differences between women’s life experiences and the law’s assumptions 
or imposed structures? 
 
                                                 
15  Wishik, supra note 11, p 25. 
16 The Council of Europe (1998), “Gender Mainstreaming, Conceptual Framework; 
Methodology and Presentation of Good Practices” , Strasbourg, 1988. 
17 For more on the feminist debate on the concept of  “woman”, see below, Chapter 1.4. 
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 What patriarchal interests are served by the mismatch? 
 
 What reforms have been proposed in this area of law or women’s life 
situation? How will these reform proposals, if adopted, affect women both 
practically and ideologically? 
 
 In an ideal world, what would a woman’s life situation look like, and what 
relationship, if any, would the law have to this future life situation? 
 
 How do we get there from here?18  
 
As the Council of Europe so rightly has pointed out, so called “gender neutral” 
texts often reproduce inequalities as it is the male that is taken as the format. 
In order to correct this inherited, discriminatory practice, it is rather unequal 
than equal treatment that is required.19 It is, therefore, needed to apply a 
feminist methodology when looking at gender aspects of legislation and 
implementation. “We will not have genuinely ungendered jurisprudence…until 
we have a legal doctrine that takes women’s lives as serious as it has taken 
men’s”.20 
 
1.2. The public/private dichotomy 
 
Central to the gendered critique of international law, including refugee law, 
has been an analysis of the public/private dichotomy.21 In domestic law the 
division can be seen between the public world of work and commerce, and 
the private world of home and family. These two spheres are based on 
different principles of association. Participation in the (male) public sphere is 
governed by universal and impersonal criteria such as rights, equality and 
property. Participation in the (female) private sphere is determined by ties of 
blood and affection, and by the status of inequality and vulnerability of women 
in the family.  
 
The division between the public and private spheres clouds the fact that the 
domestic arena is itself created by the political realm where the state reserves 
the right to intervention.22 When women are denied their human rights in 
private, their human rights in the public sphere also suffer, since what occurs 
in “private” shapes their ability to participate fully in the public arena.23 Thus, 
the real questions are: Who defines legitimate human rights issues and who 
decides where the state should enter and for what purpose? 
 
As a consequence from the public/private dichotomy, intimate violence 
remains on the margin: it is considered different, less severe and less 
deserving of international condemnation and sanction than officially inflicted 
violence. But when stripped of privatisation, sexism and sentimentalism, 
                                                 
18 Wishik, supra note 11, at 26-29. 
19 The Council of Europe, supra note 16. 
20 West, supra note 14, at 88. 
21 Heaven Crawley, “Refugee and Gender, Law and Process”, Jordan 2000, at 17. 
22 Romany, supra note 10, at 94. 
23 Bunch, supra note 7, at 14. 
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gender-based violence is no less grave than other forms of inhumane and 
subordinating official violence, which have been prohibited by treaty and 
customary law and recognised by the international community as jus cogens, 
or peremptory norms that bind universally and can never be violated.24  
 
Feminist scholars have stressed that the very jurisdiction of international law 
is divided along these same public/private lines.25 As international law evolved 
as a set of rules intended to regulate relations among states and as it remains 
centred on the state, women’s experiences tend to get lost from the agenda. 
For instance, 
 
 Many abuses against women have not been acknowledged as human 
rights violations because they are committed by private persons rather 
than by agents of the state. 
 
 Civil and political rights hold a privileged position in human rights law 
despite formal recognition by the international community of their 
interdependence and indivisibility with economic, social and cultural 
rights.  
 
 International norms concerning the life of the family call on states to 
protect the institution of the family and enshrine the right of privacy in 
the family.26  
 
Refugee law suffers from the same defect. Whilst the refugee definition does 
not intrinsically exclude women’s experiences, in practice the public/private 
distinction is used in such a way that what women do and what is done to 
them is often seen as irrelevant to refugee law. In order to include women’s 
experiences into refugee law, it is necessary to move from conventional 
notions of the exercise of power as something that has to be within a formal 
institutional framework.27  
 
1.3. Legal equality 
 
Much debate in the feminist discourse has focused on the concept of legal 
equality, and there are a number of different responses to this issue. One 
response has been to attempt to equate legal treatment of sex with that of 
race and deny that there are in fact any significant natural differences 
between women and men. Christine A. Littleton calls this response the 
“symmetrical” approach. A competing “asymmetrical” approach rejects this 
                                                 
24 Rhonda Copelon, “Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture”, in 
“Human Rights of Women, National and International Perspectives”, ed. Rebecca J.Cook, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, 116-152, at 117. 
25 Karen Knop, “Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law” 
(1993), Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 293-344, at 330.  
26 Donna Sullivan, “The Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law” in 
Women’s Rights, Human Rights, Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, Routledge, Great Britain, 
1995, 126-134, at 126-127. 
27 Crawley, supra note 21, at 24. 
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analogy and instead holds that women and men are, or may be, different and 
that women and men are often asymmetrically located in society.  
 
There are two models of the symmetrical vision; 
 
1) “Assimilation” is based on the notion that women, given the chance, 
really are or could be just as men.  
 
2) “Androgyny” also posits that women and men are, or at least could be, 
very much like each other, but argues that equality requires institutions 
to pick some golden mean between the two and treat both sexes as 
androgynous persons would be treated.  
 
Asymmetrical approaches, on the other hand, take the position that 
differences should not be ignored or eradicated. Asymmetrical approaches 
include “special rights”, “accommodation”, and “acceptance”; 
 
1) The “special rights model” affirms that men and women are different, 
and asserts that cultural differences, such as childrearing roles, are 
rooted in biological ones, such as reproduction. Therefore, it states that 
society must take account of these differences and ensure that women 
are not punished for them. 
  
2) The “accommodation model”, even though it agrees that treating 
biological differences is necessary, argues that cultural and hard-to-
classify differences should be treated under all-equal-treatment or the 
androgynous model.  
 
3) A third asymmetrical model would be “acceptance”. It asserts that 
eliminating the unequal consequences of sex differences is more 
important than debating whether such differences are “real”, and even 
more important than trying to eliminate these differences altogether. It 
is thus the consequences of gendered difference, and not its source 
that equal acceptance addresses. The focus of equality as acceptance 
is not on the question of whether women are different, but rather on the 
question of how the social fact of gender asymmetry can be dealt with 
so as to create some symmetry in the lived out experience of all 
members of the community.28 
 
However, at this stage it must be held that concepts of equality and non-
discrimination can only partially explain gender subordination and may even 
risk to trap women’s rights within legal confines that do not adequately 
capture the nature of such subordination.29 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Based on Christine A. Littleton, “Reconstructing Sexual Equality”, in Feminist Legal Theory, 
Foundations, Ed. D. Kelly Weisberg, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1993, 248-263. 
29 Romany, supra note 10, at 99. 
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1.4. The concepts of women and gender  
 
The definition of women and as well as the question whether it is possible to 
generalise the experience of women into one common, is crucial for the 
argument in this paper. The notion of a “woman”, as she is presently 
constructed by male society, differs according to different schools in feminist 
theory. Liberal feminism sees “women” defined primarily as someone confined 
to the private sphere; Radical feminism sees her as a man’s sexual object; 
Cultural feminism sees her as caring and connected to others; Postmodern 
feminism sees her so overly determined that she is an absence, not a 
presence.30  
 
The definition of “woman” is, as stated above, crucial, but self-definition for 
women has not been explored enough yet. It is important that feminists are 
more explicit about their understanding of what “woman is” and what “woman 
should be”. Patricia Cain suggests that in order to achieve this, consciousness 
can serve as a cornerstone in the feminist method. Consciousness is about 
giving a voice to the unknown in women’s experience and it brings new 
understanding by making known the unknown. Feminist legal theories, which 
supports the telling of the individual truths should therefore be built, as well as 
theories that protect the space that is shared with others as women construct 
their identity.31  
 
There has been an evolving recognition by most feminist scholars that 
women’s lives can only be fully understood when studied in terms of prevailing 
gender relations.32 Gender is a socially constructed definition of women and 
men. It is the social design of a biological sex, determined by a conception of 
tasks, functions and roles attributed to women and men in society and in 
public and private life. As it is a culturally specific definition of femininity and 
masculinity, it varies in time and space. The construction and reproduction of 
gender takes place at the individual level as well as at the societal level. 
Individual human beings shape gender roles and norms through their 
activities and reproduce them by conforming to expectations.33 The 
understanding of gender as both an aspect of personal identity and an integral 
part of social institutions and practices, avoids the pitfalls of voluntarism, that 
is, the idea that people exercise free choice over their actions, and various 
forms of determinism, which suggest that human behaviour is wholly 
conditioned by constraints.34 
 
However, it is necessary to clarify that on one hand, gender was developed 
and is still often used as a term contrasting to sex, in order to depict what is 
socially constructed as opposed to what is biologically given. Following this 
distinction, gender is typically thought to refer to personality traits and 
                                                 
30 Patricia A. Cain, “Feminism and the Limits of Equality” in Feminist Legal Theory, 
Foundations, Ed. D. Kelly Weisberg, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1993, 237-247, 
at 244. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Steans, supra note 12, at 4. 
33 The Council of Europe, supra note 16.   
34 Steans, supra note 12, at 13. 
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behaviour while sex refers to the physical body, hence gender and sex are 
understood as antonymous. On the other hand, gender has increasingly 
become used to refer to any social construction relating to the female/male 
distinction, including those constructions that separate “female” bodies from 
“male” bodies. This latter usage has emerged when many came to realise that 
society not only shapes personality and behaviour, it also shapes the ways in 
which bodies appear. Hence, if the body itself is always seen through social 
interpretation, then sex is not something that is separate from gender but is, 
rather, subsumable under it.35 Consequently sex-based and gender-based 
persecution should be seen as integral parts of the same phenomenon, and 
when gender is used throughout this paper, it is with this latter understanding. 
 
1.5. Universal human rights for whom? 
 
Human rights law excludes women’s experiences in many ways by an 
inherent male bias. When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
was prepared, the original draft referred to “…all men are brothers…”. It was 
thanks to lobbying of women’s organisations and the president of the working 
group, Eleanor Roosevelt, that the text was changed to “all humans are born 
equal” and sex was included in the non-discrimination clause.36 When the 
Refugee Convention was drafted in 1951 no women participated and this may 
be part of the reason why gender-based persecution was overlooked. The 
consequences of this will be described in the next chapter in this paper. 
 
The UDHR has, despite the efforts of Mrs Roosevelt, received criticism for 
being too male oriented. As the first who advanced the cause of human rights 
were Western-educated, propertied men, who mostly feared the violation of 
their civil and political rights in the public sphere, this area has been privileged 
in human rights work. They did not, however, fear violations in the private 
sphere of home as they were the masters of that territory, and this area has 
consequently been ignored for a long time from the human rights discourse.37 
The public/private dichotomy did not, however, prevent them from readily 
pressuring states to prevent other forms of abuse that occur in the private 
sphere at the hands of private actors, such as slavery and racial 
discrimination. 38  
 
Whereas there is almost a complete consensus that the prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of race has become jus cogens39, very few 
authors have argued that the same should be valid for the discrimination on 
the ground of sex or gender, even though it effects half of the population in 
the world.40 Those norms that are considered jus cogens get universal 
acclaim by virtue of their protection of interests which are not limited to a 
particular state or groups of states, but which belong to the community as a 
                                                 
35 Linda Nicholson, “Interpreting Gender”, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 
1994, vol. 20, no.1, 79-103, at 79. 
36 Kirilova Eriksson, supra note 9, at 9. 
37 Bunch, supra note 7, at 13. 
38 Macklin, supra note 8, at 258. 
39 Ian Brownlie, ”Principles of International Law”, Oxford University Press, 1998, at 515. 
40 Kirilova Eriksson, supra note 9, at 9. 
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whole. If human rights are truly universal, it is difficult to see how, when it 
involves white supremacy, it constitutes a violation of jus cogens, whereas 
male supremacy is considered to be the internal affair of 
41
any individual 
tate.   
astical human right violations 
omen suffer, into the human rights discourse; 
 be on par with its efforts to fight comparable 
forms of violent crime.  
stituting a violation of 
international human rights law in and of itself.  
 
                                                
s
 
Two different doctrines have evolved to include domestic violence, as 
probably the most common and widespread dr
w
 
 Through the theory of accountability the state can be held responsible 
under international human rights law for its action as well as its 
inaction. This theory finds its bases in the non-discrimination clauses 
in the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. It provides 
justification for the demand that the state’s efforts to combat domestic 
violence should at least
 
 An alternative theory claims that unlike other common crimes, 
domestic violence is inherently an issue under international human 
rights law because it systematically subordinates women. The aim is to 
maintain male supremacy and to deprive women of a range of political, 
social and economic benefits. Because of this systematic 
subordination domestic violence is seen as con
42
 
41 Romany, supra note 10, at 89. 
42 Kenneth Roth, “Domestic Violence as International Human Rights Issue”, in Human Rights 
of Women, National and International Perspectives, ed. Rebecca J.Cook, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1994, 326 – 339, at 332. 
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PART 2  REFUGEE LAW 
 
International refugee law occupies a legal space that is characterised by, on 
the one hand, the principle of state sovereignty and, on the other hand, 
competing humanitarian principles deriving from general international law and 
from different treaties.43 Historically, refugee law has been linked less firmly to 
human rights than to general principles of public international law, which has 
enabled states to pursue their own interest in a global context.44 However, 
over the years there has been a development of rapprochement to human 
rights law. One obstacle when linking refugee law and human rights, are the 
different languages in the two fields, e.g. discrimination and human rights 
violations do not necessarily amount to persecution, the notion of state 
responsibility may have different implications in the two fields, etc. Therefore, 
much time must be spent on diligently defining and exploring the meaning and 
scope of different notions. 
 
The central document in refugee law is the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees, hereafter referred to as the Refugee Convention.45 It 
defines who is a refugee and provides for certain standards of treatment to be 
accorded to refugees. However, it says nothing about procedures for 
determining refugee status and leaves to the states the choice of means as to 
implementation on the national level. Signatory states, although bound by the 
refugee definition in the Convention, are free to enact their own laws and 
regulations concerning the determination of refugee status.46  
 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is considered  
the highest authority to interpret the Convention. For this reason the UNHCR 
Handbook is quoted several times below. The refugee definition in the 
UNHCR statute and in the Convention contain very similar definitions of the 
term “refugee”. It is for UNHCR to determine status under its Statute  and any 
relevant General Assembly resolutions, and for states parties to the 
Convention and the Protocol to determine status under those instruments.47 
 
In the Convention a refugee is defined as someone who: 
 
“…owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons for race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside of his country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of his country…”48  
                                                 
43 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, “The Refugee in International Law”, Oxford University Press Inc, New 
York, 1996, at v. 
44 Reinhard Marx, “Non-Refoulement, Access to Procedures, and Responsibility for 
Determining Refugee Claims”, 7 IJRL 3, p 383-406, at 394. 
45 The Refugee Convention, Supra note 6.  
46 Pamela Goldberg, ”Where in the World is There Safety for Me?: Women fleeing Gender-
Based Persecution”, Women’s Rights, Human Rights, Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, 1995 
Routledge, Great Britain, 345-355, at 346. 
47 Goodwin-Gill, supra note 43, at 7. 
48 The Refugee Convention, supra note 45, Art 1 A.2. 
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As can be seen above the refugee in the Refugee Convention has been 
defined in a gender-neutral way. However, just as the construction of the civil 
and political character of human rights was criticised for stemming from a 
patriarchal construction of the public and private spheres in the first part of 
this paper, the same could be said for the refugee definition.49 When the 
drafters of the Refugee Convention congregated in Geneva not a single 
woman was to be found amongst the plenipotentiaries. What was in the mind 
of the drafters was the archetypal image of a political refugee, someone who 
is fleeing persecution resulting from his direct involvement in political activity. 
This definition does not often correspond with the reality of women’s 
experiences “The law has developed within a male paradigm which reflects 
the factual circumstances of male applicants, but which does not respond to 
the particular protection needs of women”.50 Until recently, the way these 
gender neutral instruments were interpreted, both at an international and 
national level, reflected and reinforced gender biases.51 The discussion 
concerning gender-based persecution signifies a first move away from this 
biased thinking. 
 
2.1. Persecution 
 
The concepts of “persecution” and “well-founded fear of persecution” have not 
been expressly defined in any of the UN human rights or refugee conventions. 
Instead the UNHCR’s Handbook can give some guidance; 
 
“…it may be inferred that a threat to life or freedom on account of 
race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a 
particular social group is always persecution. Other serious 
violations of human rights – for the same reasons – would also 
constitute persecution.”52 
 
The traditional view of what constitutes persecution reflects a male 
consideration of “normal” or acceptable conduct. However, over the past 15 
years, there has been an increased recognition of the need to interpret the 
notion of persecution in a manner which is sensitive to issues of gender. One 
of the first efforts to recognise the legitimacy of gender-based persecution 
claims occurred in 1984 when the European Community admitted that such 
claims might be recognised under the category of membership in a particular 
social group.53 In 1985, the European Parlament called on states to grant 
refugee status “to women who suffer cruel and inhuman treatment because  
they have violated the moral or ethical rules of their society.”54 During that 
same year, the Executive Committee of UNHCR issued a recommendation, in 
                                                 
49 Romany, supra note 10, at 106. 
50 N Kelly, quoted in ibid.  
51 Ibid. 
52 UNHCR, “Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for determining Refugee Status”, Geneva, 
1979, para 51. 
53 Goldberg, supra note 46, at 347. 
54 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees, A Humanitarian Agenda, Box 5.2 Gender-
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which it acknowledges that states may recognize claims of gender-based 
persecution under the “particular social group” category.55 In 1991, the 
UNHCR adopted Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women.56 These 
guidelines confirmed the need to address gender-based persecution and the 
need for states to recognise claims for asylum and refugee status for women 
fleeing persecution on account of gender. At a later stage, the Executive 
Committee of UNHCR issued a Conclusion on Violence Against Women that 
calls for the “development by States of appropriate guidelines on women 
asylum seekers, in recognition of the fact that women refugees often 
experience persecution differently from refugee men”.57 
 
The definition of persecution according to refugee law can be seen to contain 
two elements. The first is whether the harm apprehended by the claimant 
amounts to persecution. The second is whether the state can be held 
accountable, in some measure, for the infliction of the harm. Thus, when a 
female applicant wants to demonstrate that, as a woman, she has a well-
founded fear, she can firstly, use evidence of her own past persecution. 
Secondly, she can point to other “similarly situated” women who have been 
subject to persecution. E.g., an Iranian woman who is subject to a law 
requiring her to wear a veil in public. If the law is persecutory, a woman will 
certainly be unable to show that she has been uniquely singled out by that law 
(it applies to all women), yet she can still argue that she has a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted by the application of the law to her.58 
 
Gender-based violence constitutes a type of harm that is either particular to 
the person’s sex or gender, such as female genital mutilation, forced 
prostitution, rape and other sexual abuses that affects women 
disproportionately.59 Gender-based persecution can take many forms. It can 
range from the forced marriage of an underage Zimbabwean woman to a man 
many years her senior, to a woman in China who fears being forced to 
undergo an abortion and perhaps even sterilisation because she already has 
one child, to an Iranian woman who flees her country because she cannot 
follow the restrictive religious and social practices mandated by law and fears 
severe punishment should she return.60 
 
Gender-based persecution includes; 
 
 When a woman is persecuted because of her gender, it addresses the 
causal relation between gender and persecution, her gender is the 
reason for why she is persecuted. 
 
                                                 
55 UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 39, supra note 5.  
56 Information Note on UNHCR’s Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, UNHCR, 
42nd Sess., UN Doc. ES/SCP/67 (1991).  
57 UNHCR Executive Committee, 44th Sess. Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence, 
Conclusion 2, A/AC.96/XLIV/CRP.3 (1993). 
58 Macklin, supra note 8, at 238. 
59 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, A/C.3/48/1.5, 23 
February 1994. 
60 Macklin, supra note 8, at 348. 
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 When a woman is being persecuted as a women, it is the form of 
persecution that is sex/gender-specific. Understanding the ways a 
woman is persecuted as a woman is critical to naming as persecution 
things that are done to women and not to men.  
 
 When gender can be considered to be a risk factor that makes a 
woman’s fear of persecution more well-founded than that of a man in 
similar instances.  
 
Though one or more of these links between gender and persecution may be 
present simultaneously in a given case, they are not synonymous. For 
example, a woman may be 
 
 persecuted as a woman (e.g. raped) for reasons unrelated to gender 
(e.g. membership in an opposition political party); 
 
 not persecuted as a woman but still because of gender (e.g. flogged for 
refusing wearing a veil); 
 
 and persecuted as and because one is a woman (e.g. genital 
mutilation).  
 
All three of these cases present examples of gender-based persecution. But it 
does not necessarily mean that they should all be classified as persecution on 
grounds of gender, regardless whether gender is propounded as a separate 
group of persecution or as a particular social group. 
 
The scheme above may help to clarify that not all persecution of women 
should framed as “persecution because of gender”, as that would only 
reinforce women’s marginalisation. It would imply that only men have political 
opinions, only men are activated by religion, only men have racial presence. 
In that way it would create and sustain the stereotype that men “own” the 
categories of oppression that are not explicitly “gendrified”. But in the cases 
where gender is the discrete basis of persecution, it is critical that it is named 
such, since it otherwise would mask the specificity of women’s oppression. 61  
 
2.1.1. Persecuting laws and customs 
 
Gender-based discrimination is practised universally and is enforced through 
law, social custom, and individual practice. In 1990, the UNHCR Executive 
Committee affirmed the linkage between a violation of the rights guaranteed 
under the Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW)62 and persecution for purposes of the Refugee Convention, stating 
that severe discrimination prohibited by CEDAW can form the basis for the 
granting of refugee status.63  
                                                 
61 Based on supra note 8. 
62 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, A/C.3/48/1.5,23 
February 1994. 
63 UNHCR Executive Committee, “Note on Refugee Women and International Protection”, 
EC/SCP/59 (28 Aug. 1990), at 5. 
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In the UNHCR Handbook it is stated that discrimination amounts to 
persecution if:  
 
“the measures of discrimination lead to consequences of a 
substantially prejudicial nature for the person concerned, e.g. 
serious restrictions on his (sic!) rights to earn his livelihood, his 
rights to practice his religion, or his access to normally available 
educational facilities (…) In order to determine whether 
prosecution leads to persecution, it will also be necessary to refer 
to the laws of the country concerned, for it is possible for a law not 
to be in conformity with adopted human rights standards”.64  
 
In 1993, Canada, as one of the first countries in the world, issued guidelines 
on how to handle asylum applications resulting from gender-based 
persecution. They provide the following clues to the extent that discrimination 
may be sanctioned unofficially as “policy” or formally in law: 
 
“A woman’s claim to Convention refugee status cannot be based 
solely on the fact that she is subject to a national policy or law to 
which she objects. The claimant will need to establish that: 
- the policy or law is inherently persecutory; or 
- the policy or law is used as a means of persecution for one of 
the enumerated reasons; or 
- the policy or law, although having legitimate goals, is 
administered through persecutory means; or 
- the penalty for non-compliance with the policy or law is 
disproportionately severe.”65 
 
Thus, it appears that if the law discriminates by selectively abrogating 
fundamental human rights of designated groups, the law itself persecutes. In 
principle, it should not matter whether it would be relatively “easy” for a 
woman to obey the law (and thus avoid persecution), e.g. by wearing a veil, if 
in so doing she must forsake a protected freedom. Another example of 
legislated discrimination that can be construed as inherently persecutory are 
Pakistan’s Hudood laws. The Hudood Ordinances are Islamic Penal Laws 
which criminalizes, among other things, adultery, fornication and rape, and 
prescribe punishments for these offences that include stoning to death, public 
flogging and amputation.66 These laws affect all citizens of Pakistan, but are 
applied to women with particularly disastrous effects. A discriminatory policy 
with a legitimate goal but pursued through persecutory means, might be the 
one child policy in the People’s Republic of China. A scenario where the 
penalty for non-compliance with a discriminatory law might be 
disproportionately severe, might be illustrated by the Iranian law that makes a 
                                                 
64 UNHCR Handbook, supra note 94, at para 54 and 59. 
65 The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, Guidelines issued by  the Chairperson 
Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, 1993, at para 8.  
66 For more on Hudood laws, see Human Rights Watch “Double Jeopardy, Police Abuse of 
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women’s failure to wear a chador a criminal offence punishable by seventy-
five whiplashes.67 
 
2.1.2.  Violence against women  
 
The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women defines 
violence against women as:  
 
“any act of gender based violence that results in, or is likely to 
result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to 
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty”.68  
 
A recent report by Amnesty International on violence against women has 
eloquently described violence against women and its roots: 
 
“Torture of women is rooted in a global culture which denies 
women equal rights with men, and which legitimises the violent 
appropriation of women's bodies for individual gratification or 
political ends. (…) Violence against women feeds off this 
discrimination and serves to reinforce it. When women are abused 
in custody, when they are raped by armed forces as ''spoils of 
war'', when they are terrorized by violence in the home, unequal 
power relations between men and women are both manifested 
and enforced. (…)There is an unbroken spectrum of violence that 
women face at the hands of men who exert control over them.”69  
 
As Amnesty International points out, the fundamental reason for violence 
against women lies in the global culture of inequality. However, the reasons 
for why individual women are singled out for violent treatment can vary. It may 
be because of her sex and gender, because of her relationship to a man or 
because of the social, religious or ethnic group she belongs to or a 
combination of these.70 
 
Violence against women is often connected to certain misconceptualisations 
of the notion of “honour”, honour as it is being conceptualised by families and 
whole communities in terms of the chastity of “their” women.71 It has been 
stated by the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women that: 
 
“A key component of community identity, and therefore the 
demarcation of community boundaries, is the preservation of 
communal honour. Such honour is frequently perceived, by both 
                                                 
67 Macklin, supra note 8, at 230. She further makes some useful comparisons to non-
gendered cases. 
68 UN Declaration on Violence Against Women, supra note 59, art. 1. 
69 Amnesty International, “Broken bodies, shattered minds. Torture and ill-treatment of 
women”, ACT 40-001-2001 
70 Women, Law & Development International, “Gender Violence: The Hidden War Crime”, 
Washington D.C., 1998, at 20. 
71 Ibid. 
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community members and non-community members, as residing in 
the sexual behaviour of the women in the community.”72 
 
“If attitudes towards female sexuality are often the cause of 
violence against women, it becomes important for society to 
“protect” its women from the violence of “the other”.73 
 
Protecting the honour of the woman, and in turn the honour of the nation, 
therefore, gains political significance, and will be enforced either directly 
through the state, as seen in legislated discrimination and laws regulating 
women’s behaviour, or through a woman’s family and community.74 
International law has not been immune from these discriminatory notions of 
honour either, as until lately international humanitarian law has addressed 
sexual assaults in terms of women’s honour, as is elaborated below. 
 
2.1.2.1.  In armed conflicts 
 
The deconstruction of a culture can be considered one of the primary goals of 
warfare, because only through its destruction – which involves destruction of 
people – can a decision be forced. Women are therefore being targeted 
because of their cultural position and their important role within the family 
structure.75 Cultural biases toward women in peacetime serve to exacerbate 
the exploitation of women during wartime. The kind of gender-specific 
concepts of honour that is described above, finds its ultimate expression in 
times of war where women are considered to be the vessels of the community 
honour, and men its protectors. Sexual violence is and continues to be an 
effective weapon as the men who belong to the same group as the raped 
women, often exacerbate and perpetuate the crime by rejecting the women 
that have been sexually abused and by putting the blame on the women.76  
 
When women are being persecuted by state agents in their homes, this has 
powerful symbolic motives. It is often intended to demonstrate that the state 
does not recognise “boundaries” between public and private spheres, and that 
nowhere is sacred. There are clear parallels between family torture, where 
women are being tortured or raped in front of their children or husbands, and 
the way in which rape has been used as an instrument of war, as a means to 
terrorise the (male) enemy and brutalise the whole community through 
violation of “its” women.77  
As indicated above, an obstacle against the recognition of gender-based 
violence in international law has been that, until recently, international 
humanitarian law has addressed sexual violence in terms of women’s honour, 
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separate from other crimes of violence, such as murder, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture. This definition makes sexual violence a moral crime 
instead of the violent physical crime it actually is. It also represents biased 
thinking, implying that only ”pure” women can be raped. Where rape is treated 
as a crime against honour, the honour of women is called into question and 
virginity and chastity is often a precondition for rape to qualify as a crime. 
Honour implies the loss of status or respect; it reinforces the social view, 
internalised by women, that the raped woman is dishonourable.78  
Rape and sexual abuse in connection with armed conflicts have proven to be 
a very effective propaganda tool, which can further stigmatise the abused 
women. In war propaganda women are portrayed as victims and the abuses 
are blamed on the enemy and used to instil anger and hate.79 The Zagreb-
based Centre for Women War Victims have expressed their fears as follows:  
 
“… we fear that the process of helping raped women is turning on 
a strange direction, being taken over by governmental 
institutions… and male gynaecologists in particular. We fear that 
the raped women could be used in political propaganda with the 
aim of spreading hatred and revenge, thus leading to further 
violence against women and to further victimisation of survivors.”80  
 
2.1.2.2. By their family members  
 
The UN Report on Violence Against Women in the Family states that: 
 
“There is no simple explanation for violence against women in the 
home. Certainly, any explanation must go beyond the individual 
characteristics of the man, the woman and the family and look to 
the structure of relationships and the role of society in 
underpinning that structure. In the end analysis, it is perhaps best 
to conclude that violence against wives is a function of the belief, 
fostered in all cultures, that men are superior and that the women 
they live with are their possessions or chattels that they can treat 
as they wish and as they consider appropriate.”81  
 
It has also been argued by feminist scholars that domestic violence equals 
torture. Rhonda Copelon bases her argumentation responding to four critical 
elements that are generally defined in binding instruments: (1) severe physical 
and/or mental pain and suffering; (2) intentionally inflicted; (3) for specified 
purposes; (4) with some form of official involvement, whether active or 
passive.  
 
                                                 
78 Rhonda Copelon, “Surfacing Gender: Re- Engraving Crimes Against Women in 
Humanitarian Law”, Hastings Women’s Law Journal, Vol. 5:2, Summer 1994, at 249. 
79 Women, Law & Development International, supra note 70, at 20. 
80 M.Belic and V.Kesic, quoted in Christine Chinkin, “Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in 
International Law”, European Journal of International Law,  Vol. 5 (1994) No.3,  
81 UN Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, “Violence Against Women in 
the Family”, U.N. Sales. No E.89.IV.5, New York, United Nations 1989. 
 20
In response to the argument that torture is different because its purpose is to 
elicit information she states: 
 
“This distinction, which harks back to the original nature of torture, 
ignores the contemporary understanding of torture as an engine of 
terror… …It may also reflect a gender-biased identification with 
the victims of state torture as opposed to domestic violence – the 
torture victim resisting the giving of information is heroic, whereas 
the battered woman somehow deserves it.”82 
 
Understanding domestic violence as torture would have drastic implications 
on refugee law, as the principle of non-refoulement prohibits states to return 
an asylum seeker to a country where he/she faces torture.83 Another 
interesting aspect is that violence against women within their homes is not 
limited to countries of the so-called “developing” world but also exists in the 
countries in which women seek asylum.84 Many women have been forced to 
leave their countries, normally seen as democratic and respecting human 
rights, because the state has not been able to protect them from violent 
husbands or boyfriends.  
 
2.2. State responsibility  
 
2.2.1. In human rights law 
 
For a long time, there was an assumption that states are not responsible for 
violations of women’s rights in the private or cultural sphere. The reasons for 
this have been described in the first part of this paper. As already established 
above, this assumption largely ignores the fact that such abuses are often 
condoned and even sanctioned by states even when the immediate 
perpetrator is a private person.  
 
However, as the human rights discourse developed and began to take the 
experience of women into account, two routes were distinguished to hold 
states responsible for systematic “private” male violence against women: 
 
 By systematically failing to provide protection for women from “private” 
actors who deprive women of their right to life, liberty and security, the 
state becomes complicit in the violation.  
 
 The state can be responsible for failing to fulfil its obligation to prevent 
and punish violence against women in a non-discriminatory fashion, a 
failure denying women the equal protection of the law.85 
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In the procedure of determining state complicity in “private” violations against 
women, it is not enough to point to random incidents of non-punishment of 
perpetrators of violence against women. Thus, it is when the state fails to 
arrest, prosecute, and imprison perpetrators of violence against women, that it 
can be interpreted as acquiescence in or ratification of the private actor’s 
conduct. It can be described as the verifiable existence of a parallel state with 
its own system of justice; a state sanctioned by the official state, which 
protects male power through embodying and ensuring existing male control 
over women at every level.86  
 
2.2.2. In refugee law 
 
There is an important difference between a failure of state protection under 
international refugee law and the notion of state responsibility in human rights 
law. Under refugee law it needs to be established that there has been a failure 
of state protection and not necessarily that the state is accountable or 
culpable for the harm sustained or feared, as described above. By way of 
example, an applicant will need to show that a policy or law is inherently 
persecutory, that the policy or law is used as a means of persecution for one 
of the enumerated reasons, that the policy or law, although having legitimate 
goals, is administered through persecutory means, or that the penalty for non-
compliance is disproportionately severe. In this context, the existence of 
certain laws or social policies or the manner in which they are implemented, 
may themselves constitute or involve a failure of state protection.87 Thus, the 
turning point when a “common crime” becomes persecution depends on the 
role of the state in systematically failing to protect the claimant from the feared 
harm.88 
 
The failure to recognise violence against women as a violation of  human 
rights for which a state is accountable, as described above, also has 
implications in refugee law for female asylum seekers. The problem for many 
female asylum seekers may not lie so much in the demonstrating that the 
abuse constitutes a “serious harm”, but instead to show that the state is 
implicated in, or has failed to protect from, that harm.89 
 
It should, therefore be considered persecution for the purpose of refugee law, 
when the government is passively encouraging and legitimising the abuse of 
women by refusing to intervene to protect against human rights violations, to 
investigate charges, or to prosecute and punish perpetrators of harmful 
acts.90 The same applies if a state pays inadequate attention to prevent one 
particular form of violence in relation to other comparable forms of violence.91 
Further, statues and laws which are enforced by the government can be 
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gender-neutral albeit discriminatory and applied in a manner that targets 
women and also in these cases the state involvement is clear.92 In situations 
of domestic violence, state inaction may take the form of official condoning 
(e.g., marital rape exemptions in law). However, it is more often the case of 
lack of police response to pleas for assistance, refusal to investigate or 
prosecute individual cases, and a reluctance to convict or punish. This 
indicates that, while violence against women may be legally proscribed, it is 
socially accepted.93 The UNHCR Handbook takes the position that “acts by 
private citizens, when combined with state inability to protect, constitute 
“persecution”.94 
 
In order to respond to the experiences of women as asylum seekers, the 
assessment within the determination process of whether there has been a 
failure of state protection must reflect existing international obligations to 
protect against systematic abuse based on gender.95 The duty imposed on 
the state to prevent and punish should be one of due diligence. Due diligence 
requires the existence of reasonable measures of prevention that a well 
administered government could be expected to exercise under similar 
circumstances.96 
 
2.3. The grounds for persecution  
 
Some of the most difficult issues in current jurisprudence arise over whether a 
gender-related asylum claim involves persecution “on account of” one of the 
five enumerated grounds which are norms of non-discrimination.97 While race, 
religion, nationality, member of a particular social group and political opinion 
appear in the 1951 Refugee Convention, persecution and well-founded fear of 
persecution on the basis of gender are not included as an explicit category.  
 
2.3.1. Race 
 
In the UNHCR’s Handbook it is stated that racial discrimination amounts to 
persecution if: 
 
“…a person’s human dignity is affected to such an extent as to be 
incompatible with the most elementary and inalienable human 
rights, or where the disregards of racial barriers is subject to 
serious consequences. (…)There may (…) be situations where 
due to a particular circumstances affecting the group, such 
membership will in itself be sufficient ground to fear persecution.98 
 
Women are often not only targeted because of their own race but also 
because they are perceived as propagating a racial group or ethnic identity 
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through their reproductive role.99 An example of how race and gender interact 
can be found in the propaganda against the Tutsi women in Rwanda in the 
early 1990’s. When the genocide began in 1994, rape of Tutsi women were 
widespread. The targeted use of sexual violence against Tutsi women were 
fuelled by both ethnic and gender stereotypes, Tutsi women were targeted on 
the basis of the genocide propaganda which had portrayed them as 
calculating seductress-spies bent on dominating and undermining the Hutu. 
They were also targeted because of the gender stereotype which portrayed 
them as beautiful and desirable, but inaccessible to Hutu men whom they 
allegedly looked down upon and were “too good” for. Rape served to shatter 
these images by humiliating, degrading, and ultimately destroying the Tutsi 
women.100 
 
2.3.2. Religion 
 
Persecution on religious grounds may take various forms. According to the 
UNHCR Handbook it may consist of: 
 
“…e.g. prohibition of membership of a religious community, of 
worship in private or in public, of religious instruction, or serious 
measures of discrimination imposed on persons because they 
practice their religion or belong to a particular religious 
community”.101 
 
There is a considerable degree of overlap between the grounds of religion 
and political opinion which in many cases involve social norms, for instance 
the imposition of a dress code may rather signify a battle between women and 
the state over the control of the individual’s body and personal space, than an 
expression of religion.102  
 
In many cases, being deemed as fearing persecution on the basis of religion, 
may be too simplistic. At least to the extent that this may not comport with the 
claim that it is not religion per se, that is the problem, but rather the 
interpretations and the discursive uses of a particular religion, e.g. Islam, by 
the state.103 In order to understand the experiences of women from countries 
such as Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Sudan, it is necessary to see that 
the repression does not stem from the fact that Islam is inherently more 
oppressive to women than other religions, but rather from the fact that the 
regimes use women as a way of signalling their agenda.104 
 
2.3.3.  Nationality 
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“The term “nationality” in this context is not to be understood only as 
“citizenship”, it also refers to membership of en ethnic or linguistic group and 
may occasionally overlap with the term “race”.”105  
 
As stated in the UNHCR Handbook, the term nationality and race may in 
many cases overlap. The dynamics between gender and nationality are much 
the same as described above with regards to race. Furthermore, as with race, 
the nature of the persecution in many cases take a gender-specific form, most 
commonly that of sexual violence including rape in particular, although not 
exclusively, against women and girls.106 
 
A gender-related claim of fear of persecution may also be linked to reasons of 
nationality in situations where a law causes a woman to lose her nationality 
(i.e. citizenship) and the protection combined therewith, because of marriage 
to a foreign national.107 
 
2.3.4.  Member of a particular social group 
 
One possibility of fitting in gender-based persecution in the existing refugee 
definition, is to qualify persecuted groups of women as a “particular social 
group”. This is the solution that UNHCR itself has been advocating; 
 
“(…)States, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to adopt 
the interpretation that women asylum-seekers who face harsh or 
inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the social 
mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a 
"particular social group" within the meaning of Article 1 A(2) of the 
1951 United Nations Refugee Convention.”108 
 
By using this solution it would be possible to e.g. analyse the Saudi dress 
code by considering the plethora of rules, policies, customs, and laws 
circumscribing the lives of Saudi women. Women are not allowed to drive, 
must sit in the back of buses, are limited in their educational and employment 
opportunities, and may not travel without consent of a male relative. Thereby, 
the restriction on dress may be understood as one strand in a web of 
oppression that cumulatively amounts to persecution of Saudi women, as a 
particular social group. The various restrictions lead to “consequences of a 
substantially prejudicial nature for the claimant”109 in terms of her ability to 
access educational facilities, to earn a livelihood, and to function as an 
autonomous and independent individual.110  
 
2.3.5.  Political opinion 
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109 The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, supra note 65. 
110 Macklin, supra note 8, at 231. 
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“ Holding opinions different from those of the Government is not in 
itself a ground for claiming refugee status, and an applicant must 
show that he has a fear of persecution for holding such opinions. 
This presupposes that the applicants hold opinions not tolerated 
by the authorities, which are critical of their policies or methods. It 
also presupposes that such opinions have come to the notice of 
the authorities or are attributed by them to the applicant.”111 
 
Women who are imprisoned for political reasons run the risk of “double 
punishment”, as they are not only punished because they oppose the regime 
in some way, but also because they shirk the traditional role of women, by 
being politically active at all.112 A woman may also suffer harm on the basis of 
an imputed political opinion as a result of the perception that her political 
views are aligned with those of a dominant family or community members.113 
 
Political opinion is often interpreted as only encompassing traditional “public” 
political activity. This is, however, only a reflection of gender bias and should 
be replaced by a broad interpretation of the ground. A broader interpretation 
would make it possible to include activities that are not so publicly visible, e.g. 
providing food, clothing, medical care, hide people, pass messages and so 
on.  
 
2.3.6. Gender  
 
The initial omission of gender is understood by many as a reflection of post-
World War II thinking.114 Unfortunately, this omission has had severe 
implications for many female asylum seekers all over the world, which we can 
see by the discussion on how to include gender-based persecution into the 
already existing grounds for asylum in  the Convention. 
 
While there are differences between women across the world, there are also 
many commonalities; and while the pattern of gender inequalities varies 
around the regions, it is nevertheless a global phenomenon.115 There is a 
number of international reports that have pointed out the global nature of 
violence against women and that also indict states for their complicity in 
perpetuating its invisibility and privatisation.116 It must, therefore, be 
acknowledged, that in addition to basic needs shared with all asylum 
applicants, female asylum applicants have particular needs that reflect their 
gender and their position within society. These unique needs of females are a 
function not of innate gender differences, but of pervasive gender 
discrimination and women’s resulting inferior position in most societies.117  
 
                                                 
111 UNHCR Handbook, supra note 94, para 80. 
112 Crawley, supra note 21, at 82. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Schenk, supra note 90 
115 Steans, supra note 12, at 4. 
116 E.g. supra note 81.   
117 Schenk, supra note 90. 
 26
Obviously, not all cases where a woman is persecuted, she is persecuted on 
the base of her gender. Even though a sixth category of gender would be 
introduced, every application would still have to be considered on an 
individual basis in order to determine what is the actual ground for the 
persecution. In some cases women will be able to make claims for refugee 
status on one of the existing five grounds in the Convention, as has been 
described above. But for many, the persecution experienced or feared is of a 
type not traditionally recognised under the Convention or under most 
countries’ asylum eligibility laws.118 
 
2.4. Misconceptualisation or reconceptualisation? 
 
As a consequence of the omission of gender among the grounds of 
persecution in the 1951 Refugee Convention, the discussion has focused on 
whether women’s experiences can and should be interpreted so that they may 
be included into the already existing grounds or whether it is instead 
necessary to add a sixth ground (gender), in order to encompass all forms of 
gender-based persecution. The question is whether interpreting women’s 
special experiences into the existing grounds should be considered a 
misconceptualisation as was discussed in the first part of this paper - a 
misconceptualisation that serves to maintain the original presumptions and 
does not challenge the basis for these (biased) presumptions. Can the 
introduction of gender as a sixth ground bring about a reconceptualisation that 
would reveal, instead of conceal, the persecution that has its origin in 
women’s distinctive existential and material state of being?119 
 
UNHCR and the European Parliament have recommended that gender-based 
persecution claims be understood to fall within the category of “member of a 
particular social group”. However, with this recommendation they failed to 
acknowledge other potential bases for establishing gender-based 
persecution.120 Furthermore, this option, although it may produce socially 
desirable results, does not recognise the importance of the issue of 
persecution on account of gender. Gender as a social category might be an 
appropriate remedy if the persecution of women were isolated or temporary, 
but that approach does not afford women enough protection within the context 
of society’s recognised, widespread, and institutional persecution of women 
worldwide.121 Furthermore, it must be  acknowledged that the grounds of 
race, religion and nationality are no less socially constructed than gende 122r.  
                                                
 
To ground gender-based persecution in political opinion does not share the 
same partiality as religion or race in the way that the latter is addressing only 
one single aspect of the persecution experienced by the woman claimant. 
Instead, by equating resistance to gender oppression with a political opinion, 
one seizes the language of liberal democratic rights discourse and refashions 
it for feminist use. However, the same defect of masking gender under 
 
118 Goldberg, supra note 46, at 348. 
119 See above 1.1. Feminist jurisprudence 
120 Goldberg, supra note 46, at 231. 
121 Schenk, supra note 90. 
122 Macklin, supra note 8, at 261. 
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another name can be held against it.123 Also, by using this language one risks 
being caught in the trap of voluntarism, the idea that people exercise free 
choice over their actions. For instance, if a woman who escapes a situation of 
domestic violence is deemed to have done so on the ground of persecution of 
her political opinion, rather than her gender, it may imply that other women 
who have not escaped (or have not tried to) do not have the political opinion 
that they have the right to live without violence. Such a logic appears even 
more questionable as it is well-established in the research on domestic 
violence that one of the mechanisms behind it is that this kind of violence 
becomes part of the every day life of the woman - it becomes the normality. 
The trap of perceived normality is one of the reasons why it is so difficult for a 
battered wife to leave her abusing man.124 In that regard gender as a sixth 
ground would provide for a better recognition of the dynamics behind the 
construction and reproduction of gender.  
 
                                                 
123 Macklin, supra note 8, at 260. 
124 Mona Eliasson, ”Mäns våld mot kvinnor”, Natur och Kultur, Stockholm, 1997. 
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PART 3 THE SWEDISH EXAMPLE 
 
Having looked at gender and refugee law from an international perspective, 
we now turn to domestic legislation and application. The way gender-based 
persecution is dealt with in national refugee legislation differs considerably 
between countries. This chapter will focus on the Swedish example. The 
choice of Sweden has two reasons; firstly, the author is herself Swedish and 
is therefore more familiar with the situation in this country, and second, the 
fact that Sweden prides itself of being among the most advanced in the world 
with regard to equality between sexes. It is, therefore, interesting to analyse 
how Sweden deals with issues of gender and sex equality when it comes to 
citizens of other countries, in particular refugees. 
 
A new clause for gender-based persecution was introduced in the Swedish 
legislation in 1997, as has already been explained in the introduction. Since its 
introduction this gender-clause has been used to grant residence permits only 
in some very few cases. All of these cases concern female genital mutilation. 
In order to find plausible causes for the rare use of this clause, this section will 
examine the practice of the Swedish immigrant authorities and strives to 
establish on which basic assumptions and understandings that practice is 
based. The sources for this section are the Swedish Migration Board’s 
(Migrationsverket) Guidelines on Gender-based Persecution, which include a 
survey and case studies,125 and a report from the Swedish Refugee Advice 
Centre which analysed 80 Swedish asylum cases from a gender 
perspective.126 
 
3.1. Legislation 
 
3.1.1. On gender in general 
 
The Swedish model for equality between sexes has since long been based on 
what has been called a symmetrical vision (likhets-principen). Thus, in the 
eyes of the law, men and women are equal. It is the almost complete absence 
of any mentioning of gender in the legislation that is the most striking feature 
of the Swedish model. Hence, gender neutral legislation is the norm in the 
Swedish legislation and the law is not allowed to differentiate between women 
and men except for in two cases, i.e. military service and measures to 
increase equality at work.127 Yet, another step outside of the gender neutral 
norm was taken in 1998 when a special provision against the crime of 
violence against women in a relationship was introduced.128 This provision 
                                                 
125 Migrationsverket, ”Förföljelse på grund av kön – grunder för uppehållstillstånd.”, SIV-129-
2000-5900, 2001-03-28. 
126 Maria Bexelius, ”Kvinnor på flykt, en analys av svensk asylpolitik ur ett genusperspektiv 
1997-2000”, Rådgivningsbyrån för asylsökande och flyktingar, Nykopia, Stockholm 2001.  
127 Eva-Maria Svensson, “Genus och rätt, en problematisering av rätten”, Iustus Förlag AB, 
Uppsala, 1997, at 14-16. 
128 Gross violation of a woman’s integrity, (Grov kvinnofridskränkning) Article 4 § a in the 
Penal Law.  
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clearly recognises the asymmetrical position of men and women in the society 
and the gender dimension of this violence.129 
 
Traditionally, Swedish laws pertaining to the situation of women have had a 
primarily empirical focus, i.e. they have first and foremost been practical-
concrete and were seen as an active strategy to improve the position of 
women in society.130 This has not prevented that progressive legislative 
changes which are aimed at enhancing equality between sexes have normally 
not been used very offensively by the Swedish courts.131 Over time, it has 
become obvious that the very view on the law, its structures and its principles 
and the interpretations of different basic legal institutions seem to stop or at 
least hamper more fundamental changes.132  
 
The innovation of introducing a specific gender clause in the Swedish refugee 
legislation can thus be viewed as an anomaly in traditional Swedish 
legislation, in that it emphasizes gender in a legislation that otherwise is silent 
on the issue, with the few exemptions mentioned above. On the other hand, it 
may also form part of an effort to remedy underlying imbalances in the same 
spirit as the crime on violence against women. For now, however, one can 
only  speculate on the actual origins of the gender clause, as, whereas the 
preparatory work on the revision of the legislation on violence against women 
was very ambitious and profound, the same can hardly be said about the 
preparatory work to the new gender clause in refugee law. (More on this 
below!) 
 
3.1.2. On asylum issues 
 
Before 1997, an asylum seeker could get a Swedish residence permit as a 
Convention refugee, as a de facto refugee or on humanitarian grounds.133 De 
facto refugee status was granted to asylum seekers who, without being a 
refugee in the meaning of the Refugee Convention, were unwilling to return to 
their countries of origin on account of the political situation there and were 
able to plead very strong grounds in support of this. In 1983, a proposal to 
include also persons fleeing gender-based persecution in this category was 
rejected with the argument that persons fleeing gender-based persecution 
should instead be granted residence permits on humanitarian grounds.134 Yet, 
in cases where applicants are granted residence permits on humanitarian 
grounds, there is no right to such protection, as it is granted by discretion in 
cases where the conditions of removal would make a deportation 
inhumane.135  
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In 1997, a new structure and a new terminology was introduced in the 
Swedish Aliens Act (Utlänningslagen).136 The term “de facto refugee” was 
taken out and a new category was introduced to cover what the law terms 
“persons otherwise in need of protection”. In this category a new protection 
ground was introduced which covers persons who “have a well-founded fear 
of persecution on account of his gender (kön) or sexuality”. At the same time 
the Swedish parliament rejected the idea of including gender under the 
category of “member of a particular social group” in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, claiming instead that this type of persecution would, through the 
special article, get a stronger protection than before.137  
 
The new article 3.3 reads as follows:138 
 
“In this law, the term ‘persons otherwise in need of protection’ 
refers to aliens who, in cases other than those referred to in 
section 2139 (i.e. cases covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
author’s remark), has left the country of which he is a citizen 
because he 
1. has a well-founded fear of being sentenced to death penalty or 
corporal punishment, or of being subjected to torture or other 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 140 
 
2. needs protection on account of an external or internal armed 
conflict or cannot return to his country of origin on account of 
an environmental disaster or 
 
3. has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his 
gender (kön) or homosexuality.” 141  
 
In the preparatory work to the new article it is explained that the article is 
written with the 1951 Refugee Convention in mind, i.e. the level of persecution 
and fear should be equivalent to that required by the Convention to qualify for 
refugee status. It is also expressed that a combination of different 
harassments and restrictive measures may constitute a ground for asylum, 
even though each separate action may not.142   
 
As stated above, the preparatory work on the new gender clause does not 
provide much guidance concerning the interpretation and implementation of 
the law. The major confusion arises over the interpretation of the notion of 
“kön”, as has already been described above. But also a more thorough 
investigation of the gender dimension of persecution, as was provided in the 
preparatory work on the law on violence against women, would be needed. 
 
                                                 
136 Utlänningslagen (SFS 1989:529) as amended by SFS 1996. 
137 Supra note 134. 
138 Supra note 136, Chapter 3, Section 3, author’s translation. 
139 Hereafter the refugee article. 
140 Hereafter the torture clause. 
141 Hereafter the gender clause. 
142 Proposition 1983/84:144, author’s translation. 
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3.1.3. The confusion of gender 
 
As a consequence of the fact that there is no explanation of the notion of 
“kön” in the preparatory work, there has been some discussion whether it  
should be understood as encompassing both the aspect of “sex” and 
“gender”, or only one of them. Kristina Folkelius and Gregor Noll have 
questioned whether “kön” refers to sex or gender, claiming that the term “kön” 
is equivalent to the term sex and “genus” should be used in Swedish for 
gender.143 Whereas this distinction has been adopted to a certain degree in 
academic discussions in Sweden, this is not the case when it comes to 
legislation. “Genus” in Swedish is a highly academic term used mostly for 
purely scientific reasons, while the traditional meaning of kön covers both sex 
and gender. Furthermore, Swedish legislation has solely used the term kön 
throughout its history on issues concerning gender equality.144 Likewise, the 
official Swedish translation of “gender-based violence” is könsbetingat våld.145  
 
Thus, when the preparatory work is silent on the interpretation of “kön” the 
conclusion must be that it should have the same meaning as it had has in 
previous legislation. The restrictive interpretation of gender-related legislation 
by implementing organs should not be mistaken for a limitation of the law to 
(biological) sex, setting aside cases based on (social) gender. There is no 
indication that this was the intention of the law when it was introduced.  
 
There is a number of statements in the Guidelines that give the impression 
that the Migration Board does not fully take account of the gender aspect of 
“kön”; 
 
 “women who have been exposed to gender-based persecution demand 
special attention in the same way as men who have been tortured or 
otherwise exposed to severe abuses (…)”146 
This statement can of course be explained with the symmetrical vision 
that has long been the basis in Swedish legislation, men and women 
are just the same and therefore require identical treatment. However, 
the Board thereby overlooks the dynamics behind gender-based 
persecution and ignores that gender guidelines are needed just 
because gender-based violence is different and has other 
consequences for the female victim than torture has for a male victim.  
 
 “…other (forms of persecution) are completely gender specific, i.e. they 
only concern women, e.g. forced abortion or feminine genital 
mutilation.”147 
                                                 
143 E.g. supra note 133.  
144 E.g. Equal Opportunities Act (Jämställdhetslagen), SFS, 1991:433 and for more on the 
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UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. 
146 Supra note 125, author’s translation.  
147 Ibid., author’s translation. 
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The examples provided for “completely gender specific” persecution 
support the theory that “kön” should be interpreted “sex”, as they both 
concern the female body. Apparently, according to the Migration Board, 
persecution is completely gender specific when it concerns body parts 
which only exist on women. Thus, as men are the norm, it is when 
specifically female body parts are attacked that persecution becomes 
gender-specific. 
 
 “…when there is a risk for honour killing (…) the gender clause is less  
relevant as the tradition of honour killings is in the nearest gender 
neutral; it is an act that can be done to whoever has broken a social 
norm (…). A similar reasoning can be applied on cases where a 
woman risks to be punished by the authorities in an inhuman way, i.e. 
through flogging or stoning. Such inhuman punishments are most often  
not gender-specific.”148 
Also with this statement the Migration Board overlooks the gender 
dimension of notions of social norms and honour killings. (More on this 
below!) It also fails to acknowledge that even though the method of 
punishment may be gender neutral, it may nevertheless be a 
component of gender-based persecution if it is used in a gender 
specific way, e.g. for crimes that only women are sentenced for or as 
punishments that are implemented in a different way for women and 
men.   
 
 “Also in the case of less severe phenomenon as risk of social 
outcasting the same argumentation is valid.”149 
The argumentation referred to is the one above, i.e. social outcasting 
should be considered as gender neutral, as it may in theory apply to 
both gender. Of course this statement neglects that social norms often 
are different and harder for women, as are the punishments for 
breaking them, which clearly makes social outcasting a highly 
gendered phenomenon. It gets yet another gender dimension as it is 
virtually impossible for a woman to survive without the support of her 
family and community in some countries. From a female point a view 
social outcasting can therefore be a question of life and death, which 
contradicts that classifying as “less severe” by the Migration Board. 
 
3.2. Practice 
 
It is difficult to draw any clear conclusions from looking at statistics that are 
made available from the Migration Board. The obstacles are several: 
 
 Even though data has been collected concerning female applicants, 
the corresponding data is not available for male applicants. 
 
 In cases where external researchers obtained access to case files, the 
selection of the case files is still made by the Migration Board. 
                                                 
148 Migrationsverket, supra note 125, author’s translation. 
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 The motivations in the decisions are often very short and often do not 
provide enough information to clarify on which basis and reasoning the 
decision has been based on.  
 
Since the gender article was introduced in 1997 the following statistics 
concerning residence permits given to female asylum seekers have been 
collected. The figures show the numbers of women granted asylum and 
indicates on which articles in the Swedish Aliens Act the decisions were 
based. 
 
Year art 3:2 
(Convention 
Refugees) 
art 3:3 p1 
(Torture) 
art 3:3 p3 
(Gender) 
Humanitarian 
grounds150 
1997 551 211 5 3051 
1998 444 247 2 2099 
1999 299 244 15 1532 
2000 223 374 7 3314 
                
The Migration Board claims that the actual number of applicants that claim 
gender-based persecution is a relatively small compared to the total number 
of applications.151 During the years 1997-1999, a mere 22 women were given 
residence permits under the new gender clause and they all concerned 
female genital mutilation. No other form of claimed gender-based persecution 
has resulted in a successful application.152 As the torture clause provides a 
better protection than the gender clause, in cases where they both can be 
claimed, preference is given to the torture clause. 
 
The Migration Board estimates that the number of cases of gender-based 
persecution is limited to approximately 5% of all women seeking asylum in 
Sweden.153 It is difficult to assess the relevance of this figure, as the Migration 
Board does not explain which information or conclusion this estimate is made 
on. For instance, is it limited to cases where the gender clause has been used 
so far, i.e. female genital mutilation, or does it purport to include also other 
forms of gender persecution? 
 
In order to find plausible causes for the rare use of the gender clause, the 
focus will now turn to the practice of the Swedish immigrant authorities. Such 
an analysis is, however, bound to be rather indicative and inconclusive as the 
material available is so sparse and uninformative. Thus, an exhaustive 
account of the Swedish asylum practice cannot be expected. However, it is 
nevertheless possible to establish some indications of how gender-based 
persecution is dealt with by the Swedish immigrant authorities.  
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3.2.1. Gendered customs and laws 
 
The report by the Swedish Refugee Advice Centre states that a claim of 
gender-based persecution most often involves different kinds of gender-
discriminating customs and laws.154 However, in no such case was a 
residence permit granted based on the gender clause.155 This may seem 
counter-intuitive, as one would imagine that it was for this type of cases that 
the gender clause was introduced. A closer look at the preparatory work and 
the Migration Board’s guidelines provides some clues to this effect. 
 
In the preparatory work to the new article it is stated that: 
 
“As some referral instances have pointed out it is hardly so that 
anyone risks persecution solely on the ground of belonging to a 
certain gender/sex (kön). It has to be that the person concerned at 
the same time is breaking the laws or customs of the country.”156 
 
Thus, with the understanding that “kön” only refers to sex this would imply that 
it is not the biology of women that makes them persecuted. While this may be 
true to a certain degree, there are some objections that can be made against 
it; 
 
 The same argument could be made for persecution on the grounds on 
race and nationality. Are minorities and ethnic groups persecuted 
because they are born into these or is it because they resist the role 
that the society assigns to them?  
 
 Is it possible to distinguish so definite between gender and sex? Even 
though they may express different aspects of a personality, they are 
still intertwined and are constantly interacting with each other, as was 
described in the first part. 
 
 There is hardly any parallel discussion on this in the international 
human rights discourse. Instead efforts are made to distinguish when 
women are discriminated or their rights are violated for biological 
reason and when it is based in perceptions of gender. Thus if a women 
can be discriminated against because she is a woman according to 
human rights law and it is possible that discrimination may amount to 
persecution as is stated in the UNHCR Handbook, the conclusion must 
be that she can be persecuted because she is a women.  
 
 Are minorities and ethnic groups persecuted because they are born 
into these or is it because they resist the role that the society assigns to 
them? In the latter case, they could as well be said to express a 
political opinion when they object to this assignation. 
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“Where measures of discrimination are, in themselves, not of a 
serious character, they may nevertheless give raise to a 
reasonable fear of persecution if they produce, in the mind of the 
person concerned, a feeling of apprehension and insecurity as 
regards his future existence. Whether or not such measures of 
discrimination in themselves amount to persecution must be 
determined in the light of all circumstances…”157 
 
The Migration Board used the statement in the preparatory work to reject the 
idea that general customs and legislations in a country, e.g.  the dress code in 
Iran, may constitute gender-based persecution.158 In this regard it is 
interesting to recall the discussion in the first part concerning the development 
of jus cogens.159 Would it be possible for the Migration Board to have a similar 
position regarding the race discriminating laws under the former apartheid 
regime in South Africa?  
 
The activity requirement in the statement in the preparatory work raises other 
concerns; does it imply that a woman must already have broken these laws 
and customs before she has a right to seek asylum? It seems rather 
unreasonable to expect of a woman in e.g. Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to walk 
in the streets of Kabul without a burqua160, before she can be considered to 
be persecuted on the base of her gender by the regime. Most likely, she 
would not even have survived long enough to seek asylum. Yet, if an action is 
not needed and it is sufficient for the asylum seeker to state that she is 
opposed to the customs or the law, the reference in the preparatory work 
seems unnecessary as it must be considered established that the asylum 
seeker opposes the laws and the customs she is fleeing from in this case. 
 
Furthermore, in the UNHCR Handbook persecution on the ground of political 
opinion demands that “…the applicant’s opinions not tolerated by the 
authorities have come to the notice of the authorities or are attributed by them 
to the applicant”.161 Racial discrimination amounts to persecution if “…a 
person’s human dignity is affected to such an extent as to be incompatible 
with the most elementary and inalienable human rights, or where the 
disregard of racial barriers is subject to serious consequences.”162 This would 
imply that the Swedish Migration Board demands more activity of a woman 
who is persecuted on the base of her gender than of a person that is 
persecuted on the base of his/her race, where it is enough that his/her dignity 
is affected to a certain extent. Could it be so that women’s dignity is 
considered worth less to protect than that of a man of colour? Thus, when it is 
a woman who is severely discriminated, it is also needed that she openly 
opposes the customs and laws. This would imply that when a woman wants to 
exercise her basic human rights and freedoms she is adopting a certain 
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political opinion, while men of a certain race, nationality or religion have 
inherent universal human rights. 
 
In none of the cases that were studied in the report by the Swedish Refugee 
Advice Centre, was there a discussion concerning the will or ability of the 
state to protect the women, not even when it came to states that have a 
gender-discriminating legislation.163  
 
3.2.2. Rape and other forms of sexual violence 
 
Among the 42 cases concerning sexual violence that were examined in the 
report from the Swedish Refugee Advice Centre, a residence permit based on 
the “gender-clause” was not granted in a single case. In 18 cases the 
applicant was given a residence permit on humanitarian grounds. 
 
In the guidelines from the Migration Board, there is no reference to the social 
consequences of rape and other forms of sexual violence that the victims of 
these crimes face in many countries. This is highly unfortunate as, which has 
been described in the second part of this paper, for a victim of sexual 
violence, the societal consequences afterwards may themselves constitute an 
ever bigger threat for her life and security than the crime itself. The 
stigmatisation and ostracising of the victim form part of the gender dimension 
of sexual violence.  
 
3.2.3. Domestic violence  
 
Of all cases involving domestic violence, examined in the report by the 
Swedish Refugee Advice Centre, all but one applicant was rejected. The 
applicant in that one case which resulted in approval, was allowed to stay on 
humanitarian grounds. In several cases information on a husband’s record of 
violence or a threat of murder was commented on by wordings such as 
“problems of a private nature, marital problems, problems of a family nature”. 
This phrasing can be put in contrast to the statements in the preparatory work 
on legislative reforms on violence against women in Sweden which states that 
“in many areas there is an imbalance in the power division between sexes. 
The most extreme example of this imbalance is violence that men use against 
women who they have or have had a close relationship to. (…) Men’s 
violence against women, therefore, constitutes a serious societal 
problem.”164 Thus, when women are being beaten by their husbands in 
another country it is a private matter, but when Swedish women are being 
beaten it is classified as societal issue. 
 
In none of the cases examined in the report was there any discussion 
concerning the background information on gender-discriminating customs and 
laws in connection to domestic violence. This fact is most remarkable as it is, 
as has been explained in the previous parts in this paper, just from this angle 
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that it is possible to determine whether a domestic violence case constitute 
persecution.  
 
It is further stated in the report that in most cases a claimed risk to be 
physically and sexually abused by a husband was connected to other forms of 
gender-related risks, such as getting sentenced for a husband’s adultery 
accusations, honour killings, etc. There was, however, no discussion 
concerning the possibility of that the accumulation of these risks would 
together constitute persecution.165 
 
The guidelines treats the issue of domestic violence with complete silence.   
 
3.2.4. Honour killings 
 
As the guidelines treat the phenomenon of so called honour killings, it is 
defined as “extreme violence that in most cases can be connected to the 
private sphere”. As was described above, the Migration Board claims that the 
gender clause is not relevant in cases of risk for honour killings as they can be 
considered as gender neutral. It may, theoretically, be executed against 
whoever has violated a norm or custom in the society. 
 
This extremely formalistic way of interpreting the crime of honour killing is a 
clear contradiction with how honour killings are described in the international 
human rights discourse. You don’t need very strong gender lenses to be able 
to realise that even though the word honour killing may appear gender 
neutral, in practice it only concerns women. It is the different social norms for 
women and the gendered notion of honour in connection with the low status of 
women that creates the basis for this crime.166 Honour killings have been 
condemned in several international reports that confirm the gender dimension 
to this crime, including inter alia the United Nations Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions167 and  the UN Security 
Council168. 
 
Further, the guidelines claim that the practice of “blood feud” should be 
included among honour killings. The institution of the "blood feud" can be 
considered as a male counterpart to "honour" killings of women. The aim is 
not punishment of a murderer, but satisfaction of the blood of the person 
murdered or, initially, satisfaction of one's own honour when it has been 
maculated.169 Although it can be established that honour killings and blood 
feuds both treat notions of honour, it does not mean that the mechanisms 
behind these practices are the same. Neither does it mean that by lumping 
the two together, the crimes become gender neutral. 
 
                                                 
165 Bexelius, supra note 126. 
166 Crawley, supra note 21, at 109. 
167 E.g. E/CN.4/2001/9. 
168 Working towards the Elimination of Crimes Against Women Committed in the Name of 
Honour, A/RES/55/66, 31 January 2001. 
169 Gendercide Watch Honour Killings and Blood Feuds at 
<http://www.gendercide.org/case_honour.html> 
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The Migration Board states that if the home country cannot or is not willing to 
provide protection, it may be possible to grant asylum under the torture article. 
170 It is again difficult to see why a threat to life should be classified as torture 
because it has a gendered dimension. Also, take note of the reference to the 
report of the United Nations Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions (e.g. killings/murders) above. 
 
3.2.5. Female genital mutilation (FGM) 
 
As stated above, the only category of cases that have led to granting of 
residence permits based on the new gender clause, are cases where women 
fear to be subjected to female genital mutilation. In the Migration Board’s 
guidelines it stated that also the torture clause may be used to give asylum to 
women who fear FGM since it is to be considered an “inhuman act”. 171  
Again, a gender based act of persecution is not labelled torture, but is 
circumscribed with other expressions. 
 
The cases involving FGM are the only cases which involves a discussion of 
the surrounding social context according to the report by the Swedish 
Refugee Advice Centre. Even though an applicant cannot show that her 
personal situation is so, that it could be said for certain that she would be 
mutilated, the knowledge about the general conditions in the country gives 
her a right to a residence permit. The general conditions includes e.g. the 
existence of FGM and difficulties to resist the social pressure and forced 
FGM. 172 Consideration has also been taken to whether there are known 
cases of where women have been seeking the protection against FGM and 
that traditional customs seems to be an area where the local authorities 
consider that they should not get involved.173 
 
The example of FGM shows that there is a possibility to take into 
consideration the wider context and the particularity of the act of persecution 
is regarded. Unfortunately, these considerations and discussions are lacking 
from the other cases of gender-based persecution, which may be part of the 
reason why those applicants were not allowed to stay. 
 
3.3. Critique of the Swedish legislation 
 
The gender clause in the Swedish Aliens Act has been criticised because it 
gives women less protection than if they are claiming asylum as Convention 
refugees or according to the torture article. In this regard, it has even been 
claimed that the Swedish law can be seen as discriminatory against 
women.174  
 
                                                 
170 Bexelius, supra note 126. 
171 Migrationsverket, supra note 125, author’s translation. 
172 Bexelius, supra note 126. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Folkelius and Noll, supra note 133. 
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By comparison to the gender clause the Convention refugee category gives 
access to the following benefits: 
 
 Mandatory family reunion after recognition according to Article 4 of the 
1990 Dublin Convention.175 
 
 A shorter delay in naturalisation and a potentially more favourable 
status under domestic law. 
 
 A travel document in accordance with Article 28 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. 
 
Compared to the gender clause, the torture clause offers the benefit of an 
absolute protection from removal.176 
 
Some author’s have warned that Sweden have set a dangerous precedent by 
introducing a special category for cases with a gender aspect. They fear that 
this solution may to easily be misunderstood as exclusion of these cases from 
the framework of international law by other countries.177 
 
3.3.1. Remedies 
 
As has already been stated in the beginning of this chapter, the Swedish 
legislation is based on a symmetrical vision and gender has generally been 
absent from legislative texts. The introduction of a clause specifically referring 
to gender in the Aliens Act can, therefore, be seen as a novelty in the 
Swedish legislation. The recognition that a person (a woman) may be 
persecuted on account of her gender must stem from an understanding of the 
asymmetrical positions of women and men in society. Given the fact that this 
is a new concept in Swedish law, it would be natural to expect that extra 
efforts had been put into the preparatory works on clarifications in order to 
avoid  mistakes in the acts implementation. It is, thus, quite remarkable that 
the preparatory works are so silent on the new gender clause. When a new 
criminal provision on “gross violations of a woman’s integrity” was introduced 
a year after the gender clause in the Aliens Act, it was accompanied by 
detailed preparatory work which describe in detail the mechanisms behind 
men’s violence against women, an analysis of effects on society, etc. Similarly 
detailed research should also have preceded the introduction of the gender 
clause in the Aliens Act. At the same time, it is important to keep gender 
explicitly mentioned as a ground for persecution as it flows out of the  official 
Swedish policy that recognises the imbalance of power between the sexes on 
a domestic level. It should, therefore, also do so in its relationship with aliens, 
i.e. refugees. 
 
                                                 
175 Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum 
Lodged in One of the Members States of the Community, Dublin, 15 June 1990 
176 Migrationsverket, supra note 125. 
177 Folkelius and Noll, supra note 133, at 634, 
 40
It would, however, not be enough with a clarifying preparatory work. That 
would have to be followed up with extensive training of the personnel in the 
immigration authorities. To distinguish the gender dimension demands a 
certain change of mind, as officials would have to develop what has been 
described as “gender lenses” earlier in this paper. Clearly, this is something 
that does not happen automatically through a change of the law. 
 
One of the few things expressly stated in the preparatory work is that the 
legislators wanted to strengthen the protection for gender-based persecution. 
Practical experience so far has shown that this objective has clearly failed, as 
has been explained above. In order for the gender clause to have the effect 
the legislator (presumably) intended, a number of measures would have to be 
taken: 
 
 First and foremost, the protection accorded by the gender clause must 
be strengthened and give the same level of protection as the 1951 
Convention. 
 
 It should be clarified that the gender clause ought to be seen as 
complementary to the five grounds in the 1951 Refugee Convention 
but not as exclusive, as persecutions on other grounds also may have 
gender dimensions. 
 
 Detailed and extensive research should be undertaken by the legislator 
on gender-based persecution and the mechanisms behind it, so that it 
can be clarified which cases the clause is designed for. 
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Conclusion 
 
The first part of this thesis described the feminist methodology and its “gender 
lenses” that this paper has strived to apply. The question then arises: how can 
one make women and their experiences visible and how does one adjust 
existing systems and structures so that they take account of these 
experiences? It has been argued that many feminist-inspired legislative 
reforms during the past twenty years were achieved by categorising women’s 
injuries as analogous to injuries men suffer. This method should be regarded 
as a misconceptualisation as it maintains the original (male-biased) 
presumptions and does not challenge the basis for these presumptions. 
Instead, reconstructive feminist jurisprudence should set itself the task of 
reconceptualising new rights in such a way as to reveal, rather than conceal 
their origin in women’s distinctive existential and material state of being.  
 
In the second part, this discussion was translated into the debate of 
international refugee law on how to include gender-based violence into the 
grounds of persecution, as gender was omitted when the Refugee Convention 
was created in 1951. Some argue that gender-based persecution should be 
interpreted into the already existing grounds, i.e. race, religion, nationality, 
member of a particular social group or political opinion. They say that it is not 
the omission of gender as a ground for persecution that is the problem. 
Instead, they argue that the problem is that women’s experiences have been 
interpreted as to not fit into the existing categories and it is, therefore, the 
interpretations of these grounds that need to change. The UNHCR and the 
European Parliament have argued that gender-based persecution should be 
subsumed under the ground of being member of a particular social group. 
Some have advocated that resistance to conform with gendered norms and 
customs should be classified as a political opinion. Yet, others have argued 
that where gender is the discrete basis of persecution, it is critical that it is 
named as such, since one would otherwise mask the specificity of women’s 
oppression. This paper has argued for the latter position.   
 
The third and last part of this paper examined the Swedish example, where 
gender-based persecution was introduced as a new concept in the Aliens Act 
in 1997. This was a new concept in that it for the first time named gender as a 
ground of persecution, but also as it may be seen as a step aside from 
symmetrical vision that has traditionally been the basis for Swedish legislation. 
Unfortunately, the new gender clause suffered from a number of defects 
which have hampered its significance and implementation. The most 
important defect is that it does not give the applicant the same protection as 
that given to an applicant who is granted a residence permit on the grounds 
listed in the Refugee Convention or under risk of torture. Also, the lack of 
research into the notion of gender-based persecution and its dynamics in the 
preparatory work has paved the way for a misunderstanding of the term “kön” 
in the implementation of the clause. It has, however, also been stressed that, 
as the official Swedish policy recognises the imbalance of power between the 
sexes on a domestic level, the same recognition should characterize its 
relationship with aliens, i.e. refugees. Thus, it is important to name gender-
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based persecution for what it is, but its status should be strengthened and 
equalised with the five grounds already mentioned in the Refugee Convention. 
 
As the journalist Linda Hossie criticises the Canadian gender guidelines, she 
also eloquently formulates the argumentation in favour of explicitly 
enumerating gender among the grounds for asylum: 
 
“The problem with the draft guidelines, meanwhile, is that they 
treat women’s refugee problems as a subtle variation of men’s. 
But the situation of women is unique. Forced abortion, forced 
pregnancy, ritual and (disabling) clitoridectomy – all of which are 
appallingly common – are forms of persecution that have no 
parallel in men’s experience. To oblige women seeking asylum to 
prove that such treatment is just a variation of the oppression 
faced by men is illogical and – when you get right down to it – 
discriminatory. Even when women face routine political, religious 
or ethnic persecution, it is compounded by their almost universal 
second-class status. Women draw the ire of sexist cultures much 
more readily than do men, and for much less provocative 
actions.”178 
 
There may be a fear among some, that strengthening the protection for 
gender-based persecution might result in floods of new asylum seekers. The 
reality is that permanent resettlement or asylum in a remote country will never 
be a viable or even desirable option for the overwhelming majority of 
displaced women. As the refugee scholar James Hathaway has stated “We 
are not going to see a flood of female claimants. Most women can’t get out of 
their countries, and when they can, they’re lucky to make it to the next 
country”.179 For many women, however, the ability to remain outside their 
homeland and to find refuge is of crucial importance, as forced return can 
mean persecution in the form of abuse, extreme ridicule, ostracism, and even 
death. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
178 Quoted in Macklin, supra note 8, at 257. 
179 Quoted in Macklin, supra note 8, p 220. 
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